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INTRODUCTION 
On any given day of the week, hundreds of thousands of high school students 
can be found training for or competing in any number of interscholastic sports.  For 
many teenagers, interscholastic sports are a crucial component of the high school 
experience.  Among other benefits, participation in sports provides a welcome 
break from academic stress and offers an outlet for students to interact and socialize 
with schoolmates outside of the classroom.  Participation in interscholastic sports 
also provides an opportunity for students to maintain a healthy, active lifestyle 
while also providing a structured environment for students to learn such values as 
teamwork and cooperation, healthy competition, self-discipline and responsibility.  
Because students benefit tremendously from participation in these activities, it is 
important to protect the ability of students to take part in them. 
For some students, however, the ability to participate in interscholastic sports—
either at the varsity level, or in some instances even at all—is threatened when they 
transfer schools after the beginning of the ninth grade.  Transfer rules are 
promulgated by state activities associations, which govern the regulation of 
interscholastic sports.1  Although they vary from state to state, transfer rules, in 
essence, prohibit transfer students from participating in certain sports unless the 
student falls under certain enumerated exceptions.2  One of the primary rationales 
for the rule is to prevent the recruitment and exploitation of student athletes and the 
shopping around for schools.3  In practical effect, however, the rule penalizes 
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 1. PATRICK K. THORNTON, SPORTS LAW 619 (2011). 
 2. See, e.g., IND. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2010–2011 ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION §§ 17-
8.5, 19-6.1 (2010), available at http://www.ihsaa.org/dnn/portals/0/Flip%20Book/2010/By_Laws_II/ 
index.html; CONN. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC CONFERENCE, HANDBOOK 2010–2011 § 6.0 II.C #18 
(2010), available at http://www.casciac.org/pdfs/ciachandbook_1011.pdf; MO. STATE HIGH SCH. 
ACTIVITIES ASS’N, 2010–11 MSHSAA OFFICIAL HANDBOOK § 238.3 (2010), available at 
http://www.mshsaa.org/resources/pdf/10-11MSHSAAHandbook_web.pdf; OHIO HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC 
ASS’N, BYLAWS § 4-7-2 (2010), available at http://www.ohsaa.org/general/about/bylaws.pdf. 
 3. THORNTON, supra note 1, at 619.  See, e.g., Genusa v. Holy Cross Coll., Inc., 389 So. 2d 908, 
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students who transfer for reasons completely unrelated to athletics.  In addition, 
because the rule is intended to prevent “school shopping,” the rule infringes on a 
parent’s choice to decide how to raise his children.  Such a rule specifically affects 
a family’s ability to make important family related decisions and strips from the 
parents the ability to decide in what environment their children should be raised. 
In New Jersey, the Hudson County Schools of Technology Board of Trustees 
voted to cut the district’s athletic programs, which would affect County Prep High 
School and High Tech High School, in light of recent budget cuts.4  Both schools 
offer career and vocational training to students in a technology based 
environment.5  Because of the schools’ focus on technological training, it is 
conceivable that students chose to attend these schools to take advantage of the 
very unique course offerings rather than because of the strength of the athletics 
programs, especially since its sports teams are limited in number and require less of 
a time commitment than at traditional schools.6  Because of the New Jersey State 
Interscholastic Athletic Association’s (NJSIAA) transfer rule, students who decided 
to transfer to a school that has an athletic program will be forced to sit out for at 
least thirty days unless they can show a chang 7
If a student chose to remain at either High Tech or County Prep, he may still be 
allowed to participate in athletics without any delay, but only by electing to play 
sports for a different school located in his home district.8  Although, technically, 
this allows the student to participate in interscholastic sports, in reality, this 
solution is impractical for the student and his family. The student would have to 
research trying out and practicing at a school with which he has no relationship, 
coordinate his own transportation to the school and, if they were able to find 
transportation, show up on time for practices at the second school immediately 
following classes at the first school.  Nonetheless, the NJSIAA argues, “a transfer 
is a transfer is a transfer.”9  Thus, in order for a student at County Prep or High 
Tech High School to continue participating in interscholastic sports, he would 
either have to take on the heavy responsibilities associated with attending a second 
school for athletic purposes or his family would have to take on the incredible 
909 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Bruce v. S.C. High School League, 189 S.E.2d 817, 818 (S.C. 1972); Sullivan 
v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 616 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. 1981).  For other examples, see also IND. 
HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 2, § 19(a)(8). 
 4. Patrick Villanova, Canceling Sports Programs at Hudson County Prep and High Tech High 
Schools Has Kids and Parents Weighing Moves, NJ.COM (Apr. 24, 2010, 1:00 AM), 
http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2010/04/canceling_sports_programs_at_h.html. 
 5. Mission, HCST:  COUNTY PREP HIGH SCH., http://www.hcstonline.org/countyprep/ 
mission.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2010); HIGH TECH HIGH SCH., http://www.hcstonline.org/main/ 
Default.aspx?alias=www.hcstonline.org/main/hightech (last visited Nov. 3, 2010). 
 6. High Tech High—Frequently Asked Questions, HIGH TECH HIGH, 
http://www.hightechhigh.org/faq.php#are_there_sports_teams_at_HTH (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
 7. Jim Hague, Troubles Continue for Former High Tech, County Prep Athletes, HUDSON 
REPORTER.COM (Sept. 26, 2010), http://hudsonreporter.com/view/full_story/9638011/article-
SCOREBOARD-09-26-2010-Troubles-continue-for-former-High-Tech--County-Prep-athletes-NJSIAA-
rules-that-transfer-students-must-sit-for-30-days-?instance=jim_lead_story_left_column. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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burden of uprooting their home and changing residences. 
Similarly, in Kanawha County, West Virginia, students who transfer in grades 
six through twelve must sit out of interscholastic sports for an entire year after the 
transfer.10  Jeff Goode, a parent in Kanawha County, spoke to the school board on 
behalf of his eleven-year-old son, Anthony, about the possibility of transferring 
schools.11  The Goode family originally sent Anthony to McKinley Middle School 
rather than the lower-performing Hayes Middle School for academic reasons.12  
However, after only a few weeks, Anthony wanted to transfer to Hayes Middle 
School because he missed his friends and his sister.13  Goode stated that his son 
played basketball and soccer but acknowledged that his son was “not a sports 
prodigy.”14  Nonetheless, the school board declined to consider a waiver of the 
policy for Anthony.15 
Transfer rules often place students and their families in the unenviable position 
of having to decide between participation in interscholastic sports and choosing a 
school on the basis of academic, religious, financial and/or other personal factors 
that may affect the family.  Transfer rules sweep into their purview students who 
transfer for reasons wholly or partially unrelated to academics, as well as students 
who have consciously and voluntarily decided to transfer schools only in part 
because of the new schools’ athletic program.16  In many instances similar to those 
described in the anecdotes above, the athletic associations’ fears of exploitative 
recruitment are not present.17  Nevertheless, the majority of courts continue to 
uphold the legitimacy of the transfer rule and defer to state high school associations 
on determinations of eligibility.18  This Note argues that, in light of the benefits 
received from participation in interscholastic sports and the policy interest in 
allowing parents to direct the upbringing of their children, current variations of the 
transfer rule should be discarded and replaced with a new rule focusing solely on 
the prevention of recruitment. 
Part I will introduce readers to the current applications of high school athletics 
associations’ transfer rules.  Part II will discuss how transfer rules may infringe 
upon parental rights to choose how to educate their children.  Part III will discuss 
how courts have treated transfer rules with respect to the equal protection clause.  
Lastly, Part IV will argue that transfer rules should be evaluated against a 
heightened rational basis standard and provide an alternative to current rules that 
 10. Zack Harold, School Board Debates Transfer Rule, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (Sept. 17, 
2010), http://www.dailymail.com/News/Kanawha/201009161311. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.  For other examples, see also Niles v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 715 F.2d 1027 (5th 
Cir. 1983); Walsh v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 616 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1980); Ala. High Sch. 
Athletic Ass’n v. Scaffidi, 564 So. 2d 910 (Ala. 1990); Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Hopkins Cnty. 
Bd. of Educ., 552 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). 
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will survive such heightened scrutiny. 
I.  A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF TRANSFER RULES 
Rules regulating the eligibility of transfer students to participate in sports are 
enacted by each state’s high school athletic or activities association.19  Each state, 
along with the District of Columbia, has an athletics or activities association, which 
is governed by the National Federation of State High School Associations, the 
organization that publishes the rules of competition for each sport or activity in 
which the high schools participate.20  These state associations have the power “to 
establish uniform procedures and regulations for interscholastic activities, to 
protect the welfare of the students, and to establish sensible and educationally 
sound controls.”21  Both public and private schools may voluntarily decide to join 
the state’s athletic association.22  By joining, they agree to abide by the 
association’s rules and regulations.23  Although the school’s participation in the 
association is theoretically voluntary, it is important to note that membership in the 
association is practically necessary if the school wants to participate in the state’s 
high school athletics programs.24  Further, the students themselves do not 
voluntarily join the association and have no voice in the association’s rule-making 
procedures.25  Through this “voluntary” association, the school and the student, by 
virtue of his enrollment at a member school, are automatically bound by the rules 
 19. Robert E. Trichka, State High School Athletic Associations’ Rules and Regulations Pertaining 
to Transfers and Recruiting, 5 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 89, 89 (1995).  Some associations regulate only 
interscholastic sports, while other associations regulate athletics along with other extracurricular 
activities, such as theater and music.  Compare About LHSAA, LA. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, 
http://www.lhsaafoundation.org/about.php (last visited Nov. 28, 2010) (regulating student athletics), and 
AHSAA Mission, History Statement, ALA. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, 
http://www.ahsaa.com/AHSAA/AboutUs/HistoryMissionStatement/tabid/201/Default.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2010) (providing that purpose of athletic association is to regulate, coordinate and promote the 
interscholastic athletic programs among its member schools), and About the MHSAA, MICH. HIGH SCH. 
ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.mhsaa.com/AbouttheMHSAA.aspx (last visited Nov. 28, 2010) 
(providing that purpose of athletic association is to develop rules for athletic eligibility and competition), 
with About the UIL, TEX. UNIV. INTERSCHOLASTIC LEAGUE, http://www.uiltexas.org/about (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2010) (regulating extracurricular academic, athletic and music contests), and 2010–2011 
Activities, MISS. HIGH SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, INC., http://www.misshsaa.com/Events/events.htm (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2010) (regulating athletics as well as activities such as cheer, dance, band, choir, speech 
and debate).  However, in some instances when the state association regulates other activities along with 
athletics, the transfer rules have only been applied to athletics.  See, e.g., Barnhorst v. Mo. State High 
Sch. Activities Ass’n, 504 F. Supp. 449, 450 (W.D. Mo. 1980). 
 20. About Us, NAT’L FED’N ST. HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, 
http://www.nfhs.org/Activity3.aspx?id=3260&linkidentifier=id&itemid=3260 (last visited Nov. 3, 
2010). 
 21. Robert E. Trichka & Thomas H. Sawyer, State High School Athletic Association’s Limited 
Participation Rules:  Transfer, 8 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 158, 158–59 (1998). 
 22. Trichka, supra note 19, at 89. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See, e.g., Darrin v. H.D. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 891 (Wash. 1975). 
 25. Freeman v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 51 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[F]or a student 
athlete in public school, membership in IHSAA is not voluntary, and actions of the IHSAA arguably 
should be held to a stricter standard of judicial review.”). 
BUI - FINAL 3/1/2011  4:47:42 PM 
2011] A CALL TO RECONFIGURE TRANSFER RULES 235 
 
of the association.26 
As previously stated, transfer rules vary in substance from state to state, but they 
can generally be grouped into three categories.  The first category applies a blanket 
restriction on eligibility to all students who transfer from one school to another.27  
This variation of the rule is arguably the harshest because it blindly penalizes all 
transfer students without consideration of the circumstances underlying the 
transfer.28  The second variation of the rule allows for immediate eligibility of 
transfer students who can prove that they fall under certain exceptions that the 
association has enumerated.29  These exceptions also vary from state to state but 
may include such circumstances as a bona fide change of residence by the student’s 
family; change of custody; terminal or serious illness of a parent, sibling or self; 
death of a parent or guardian; bankruptcy and/or loss of principal income of legal 
guardian; closure of former school or emancipation.30  Lastly, a few states permit 
immediate eligibility for transfer students if certain objective criteria are met.31  An 
example of such criteria would be “non-participation in a sport at the varsity level 
at the previous school,” so long as “the transfer . . . [occurs] prior to the start of 
practice in the sport.”32 
Athletics associations justify the transfer rule with a number of reasons, 
including the protection of opportunities for bona fide resident students (i.e. non-
transfer students), the protection of athletics programs at schools that are not on the 
receiving end of a transfer and the argument that participation in extracurricular 
activities is a privilege and not a right.33  The reason most often provided by 
 26. Trichka & Sawyer, supra note 21, at 163. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Trichka, supra note 19, at 90. 
 29. Id. at 91. 
 30. Eligibility:  Transfer, W. VA. SECONDARY SCHS. ACTIVITIES COMMISSION, 
http://www.wvssac.org/eligibility/Eligibility%20Transfer.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2010); IND. HIGH 
SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 2, §§ 19-6.1(d), (i); N.H. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, 
OFFICIAL HANDBOOK art. II § 19 (2010), available at http://nhiaa.org/PDFs/ 
2708/4ByLawArticleIIEligibility.pdf; OHIO HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 2, § 4-7-2 
Exception 2.  This list is not exhaustive.  For other types of exceptions, see, e.g., CONN. 
INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC CONFERENCE, supra note 2, § 6.0 II.C #18; IND. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC 
ASS’N, supra note 2, §§ 17-8.5, 19-6.1; MO. STATE HIGH SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, supra note 2, § 238.3. 
 31. Trichka, supra note 19, at 91. 
 32. Trichka & Sawyer, supra note 21, at 163. 
 33. The Supreme Court held in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 37 (1973), that education is not a fundamental right.  Other courts have held that the right to 
participate in interscholastic sports is neither a fundamental right nor constitutionally protected.  See 
Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass’n v. Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768 (Miss. 1994).  See also Wm. Nicholas 
Chango, Jr., Note, Constitutional Law—The Right to Participate in Interscholastic High School Athletics 
Is Not a Constitutionally Protected Right, Therefore, a Rule Suspending the Eligibility of Student-
Athletes Who Transfer from One High School to Another Need Only Be Rationally Related to a 
Legitimate State Objective—Mississippi High School Activities Ass’n, Inc. v. Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768 
(Miss. 1994), 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 251, 274 (1996) (“Affording constitutional protection to 
athletic participation, while education remains a non-fundamental right would seem contrary to public 
policy.”).  Even in states where education is a fundamental right afforded by the state constitution, 
courts have been reluctant to hold participation in interscholastic sports a fundamental right.  See Steffes 
v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 222 Cal. Rptr. 355, 359–63 (Ct. App. 1986). 
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athletics associations for the transfer rule, however, is to prevent the recruitment 
and exploitation of student athletes by coaches, high schools and even fans, who 
may place social pressure on star athletes to transfer to particular athletics 
programs.34  Although the current variations of the transfer rule arguably serve to 
solve the issue of recruitment, they do so at the expense of many other students 
who have not been subject to recruitment.  Rather than focusing on whether the 
student has been recruited to the school,  the rule may make presumptions that the 
student’s transfer was not bona fide.35  At worst, as in a state using the blanket 
transfer rule, the student is prohibited from competing without even being 
presented any opportunity to rebut the presumption.36 
Even though some athletic associations have attempted to account for some 
legitimate reasons to transfer, no list can hope to include each of the overwhelming 
number of potential legitimate reasons.  Although athletics may play a part in a 
decision to transfer, a student may also opt to transfer for any number of personal, 
financial, academic or social reasons.  For instance, a student’s home life may be so 
unstable and/or dangerous that it would be better for him to move to live with 
another relative; a student whose parents are divorced may decide to live with the 
other parent, without a legal court order or change in custody for personal reasons; 
a student may want to take certain courses or participate in certain academic 
programs not offered at his current school or a student may be so unhappy at his 
current school that he becomes depressed or unmotivated to participate in school, to 
interact with classmates or even to attend.  These are some of the legitimate reasons 
that may motivate a student or his parents to decide that another school is better 
suited for the student.  However, these reasons, and many others like them, are 
often not represented in the list of exceptions to the transfer rule delineated by 
athletic associations. 
In addition, the fact that athletic associations may be open to both private and 
public schools implicates a number of other circumstances under which a student 
may decide to transfer.  Aside from religious reasons, some private schools may 
have more academically challenging curricula that may attract students and/or 
parents.  In other cases, a family may have suffered a job loss or some other form 
of financial trouble that may cause the parents to be financially unable or unwilling 
to continue to send the student to private school. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the rules’ exceptions are often under-inclusive, 
some exceptions also leave broad discretion for athletic associations to determine if 
the student has proven that he or she falls under the exception at issue.  For 
example, many athletic associations have “hardship” exceptions.37  Some of these 
 34. See CONN. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC CONFERENCE. supra note 2, § 6.14 (“The intent of 
the transfer rule Is [sic] to discourage schools and/or adults from exploiting the student athlete or 
allowing or enabling that student to benefit improperly from his own act or the acts of others.”). 
 35. See, e.g., COLO. HIGH SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, TRANSFER RULE BOOKLET, available at 
http://www.chsaa.org/home/pdf/Transfer%20Rule%20Booklet.pdf. 
 36. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 616 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. 1981). 
 37. See, e.g., IND. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 2, § 17-8.5; N.H. INTERSCHOLASTIC 
ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 30, § 19(d). 
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associations outline a specific list of factors that will give rise to a hardship 
exception, such as the death or serious illness of a family member, change of 
custody or legal guardianship by a court order or an unstable home environment.38  
Other associations simply describe the event that will trigger a hardship exception 
as an “unforeseeable” or “unavoidable” condition or event beyond the control of 
the student and his or her family.39  The amorphous definitions of the hardship 
exceptions leave plenty of room for athletics associations to deny a student’s 
transfer request when it believes that a student’s particular circumstances fail to 
meet the association’s standard for “hardship.”40  Even Eric Sondheimer, a strong 
advocate of restrictive transfer rules, has expressed his confusion regarding how 
hardship waivers are granted.41  He reported that basketball player Michael Avery 
was denied a hardship waiver even though his situation arguably presented a 
financial hardship.42  Avery had attended one school freshman year, received a 
financial aid package to attend another school his sophomore year, but then 
returned to the first school when the financial aid package was not delivered.43  
This example, and many others like it, shows that the ambiguous language of 
hardship provisions allows athletics associations unfettered discretion in making 
hardship determinations and places them in the powerful position of passing 
judgment on a student’s specific difficulties. 
Similarly, some athletics associations permit immediate eligibility for transfer 
students who have a “bona fide change of residence.”44  However, in having the 
power to determine what is or is not “bona fide,” the athletics associations have 
essentially granted themselves unfettered discretion in determining whether a 
student’s move was “legitimate.”45  Such a rule places immense pressure on 
families to uproot their lives in order for the student to have full eligibility in 
interscholastic sports—even if the student desired to transfer for reasons unrelated 
to sports, such as academics or social well being.  These rules, in effect, force 
students and their families to choose between participation in interscholastic sports 
and other important aspects of the student’s or the family’s lifestyle.  None actually 
 38. See, e.g., OKLA. SECONDARY SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, HARDSHIP WAIVER MANUAL 2010–
2011, at 3 (2010), available at http://www.ossaa.com/Portals/0/docs/OSSAA%20Forms/ 
Forms%20and%20Applications%20Book/Eligibility%20Forms/hardship_waiver_manual.pdf. 
 39. See, e.g., ARIZ. INTERSCHOLASTIC ASS’N, 2010–2011 CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS 51 (2010), 
available at http://www.aiaonline.org/story/uploads/2010_2011_AIA_Bylaws_Book_1280372828.pdf 
(defining “hardship”). 
 40. See, e.g., KY. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, BYLAWS § BL-6-2 (2010), available at 
http://www.khsaa.org/handbook/bylaws/bylaw6.pdf; N.H. INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra 
note 30, art. II, § 4; WASH. INTERSCHOLASTIC ACTIVITIES ASS’N, OFFICIAL HANDBOOK § 18.11.0 
(2010), available at http://www.wiaa.com/ConDocs/Con358/Entire2010-11Handbook.pdf. 
 41. Eric Sondheimer, Boys’ Basketball:  Say What?, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2010, 8:05 AM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/varsitytimesinsider/2010/10/boys-basketball-say-what.html. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See, e.g., Eligibility:  Transfer, supra note 30; OHIO HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 
2, § 4-7-2, Exception 1. 
 45. See, e.g., Johansen v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 916 So. 2d 1081 (La. Ct. App. 2005) 
(upholding the association’s decision to declare the student ineligible, even though her family 
purportedly changed its residence in order to serve the special educational needs of a minor son). 
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limit the scope of the rule to cover only those students who have actually engaged 
in recruiting activities, even though the rules purportedly exist to reach those 
particular students.46  The current variations of the transfer rules should thus be re-
examined and rewritten in order to create rules that are better measured to directly 
address the issue of exploitative recruitment of student athletes. 
II.  THE CURRENT TRANSFER RULES VIOLATE PARENTS’ RIGHT TO 
DIRECT UPBRINGING OF THEIR CHILDREN 
High school athletics associations have articulated various reasons for the 
restrictions on transfer students.  The most significant justifications are to prevent 
the recruitment of student athletes and “school-hopping” by students and parents.47 
Secondary reasons include keeping the focus on education first and participation in 
athletics secondary, preserving the opportunities of bona fide resident students from 
being replaced and promoting the stability and harmony of member schools.48  
This Note argues that the state’s primary goal, however, should be to protect the 
interests of student athletes and the rights of their parents to make decisions 
regarding childrearing with limited governmental regulation.  In light of this 
interest, this Note will conclude that the only legitimate rationale to continue 
enforcing transfer rules is to prevent the exploitation of student athletes through 
athletic recruitment.  All other reasons are either out of the scope of the school’s 
authority or contrary to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their 
children. 
Parents undoubtedly have the right to direct the educational and moral 
upbringing of their children.  Beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska, a slew of 
Supreme Court cases have continuously reaffirmed this principle.49  In Meyer, the 
Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a teacher who had provided instruction 
on the German language in violation of a Nebraska statute that prohibited the 
 46. See Genusa v. Holy Cross Coll., Inc., 389 So. 2d 908, 909 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Bruce v. S.C. 
High School League, 189 S.E.2d 817, 818 (S.C. 1972); Sullivan v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 616 
S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. 1981); IND. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 2, §19(a)(8); THORNTON, 
supra note 1, at 619. 
 47. See Genusa v. Holy Cross Coll., Inc., 389 So. 2d 908, 909 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Bruce v. S.C. 
High School League, 189 S.E.2d 817, 818 (S.C. 1972); Sullivan v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 616 
S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. 1981); IND. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 2, §19(a)(8); THORNTON, 
supra note 1, at 619. 
 48. See e.g., KY. HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 40, § BL-6-2; N.H. INTERSCHOLASTIC 
ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 30, art. II, § 4; WASH. INTERSCHOLASTIC ACTIVITIES ASS’N, supra note 
40, § 18.11.0. 
 49. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding parents have right to control education 
of their children); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding parents have right to direct 
upbringing and education of children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (standing for 
proposition that parents have priority in custody, care and nurture of their children); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (affirming idea that parents have primary role in upbringing of children, 
particularly in areas of moral standards, religious beliefs and elements of good citizenship); Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding that parents’ interest in care, custody and control of their 
children is a fundamental liberty interest). 
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teaching of any language other than the English language.50  The Court held that it 
was unconstitutional for the State to prevent a teacher from teaching the German 
language and to prevent the parents from engaging him to do so.51  In reversing the 
conviction, the Court noted, “[I]t is the natural duty of the parent to give his 
children education suitable to their station in life.”52 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters recognized that 
the right of parents to choose whether to send their children to a private or public 
school is important to the exercise of their right to direct the upbringing of their 
children.53  In Pierce, the plaintiffs were private organizations that challenged a 
compulsory education statute requiring parents and guardians to send their children 
to public schools, with certain limited exceptions.54  One plaintiff, the Society of 
Sisters, maintained schools that taught the subjects usually taught in Oregon public 
schools along with religious and moral teachings based on the tenets of the Roman 
Catholic Church.55  The Society of Sisters claimed that the compulsory education 
law conflicted with the right of parents to choose where their children would 
receive “appropriate mental and religious training.”56  The other plaintiff was the 
Hill Military Academy, which operated, a for-profit elementary school, a college 
preparatory school and a military training school for boys.57  Along with the 
courses required by the state board of education, the Military Academy also 
provided military instruction and training.58  Because the statute mandates 
attendance at public schools, parents refused to renew their contracts to send their 
boys to the Military Academy.59  The Supreme Court held that a public school 
compulsory attendance requirement “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of 
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control.”60  The Court further noted that “the child is not the mere creature of the 
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the 
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”61 
Pierce stands for the notion that parents have a choice whether to send their 
children to public or private schools.62  Although some of the parents in Pierce 
objected to the public school requirement for religious reasons, the Supreme Court 
 50. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403. 
 51. Id. at 400. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35. 
 54. Id. at 530.  The exceptions included exemptions “for children who are not normal, or who 
have completed the eighth grade, or whose parents or private teachers reside at considerable distances 
from any public school, or who hold special permits from the county superintendent.”  Id.  Parents 
whose children did not fall under these exceptions were mandated to send their children to public 
school.  Id. 
 55. Id. at 532. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 532–33. 
 58. Id. at 533. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 534–35. 
 61. Id. at 535. 
 62. Id. 
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did not limit the right of parents to determine where to send their children to school 
to religious reasons alone.63  The Supreme Court granted an injunction prohibiting 
the state from preventing parents to send their children to the Military Academy, a 
private institution that provided nonreligious instruction.64  Accordingly, this 
decision stands for the broader proposition that parents have the right to determine 
the educational needs of their children, whether or not the decision is based on 
religious beliefs.65  Religious preferences are merely one factor a parent could 
consider when choosing a school.  Other factors parents could—and do—consider 
when choosing a school for their children include, for instance, a particular 
schools’ course offerings, the type of environment the school provides or the 
strength of its extracurricular activities, including its athletic programs.66  The 
parents in Pierce sent their children to schools that provided the same courses as 
the public schools but that also provided additional instruction in the form of 
religious or military training.67  As much as those parents were given the 
opportunity to determine the extra type of instruction provided to their children, 
parents who value interscholastic sports as an integral part of their children’s 
upbringing should also be given the ability to incorporate these sports into their 
children’s training. 
Recognizing that it is the parents’ responsibility to prepare their children for 
additional societal obligations, such as entering the workforce, parents may 
sometimes want to take into consideration athletic motivations in considering 
where to enroll their children in school.  Participation in team sports teaches 
students skills such as teamwork, cooperation and self-discipline.68  Since athletics 
associations also mandate academic eligibility requirements, interscholastic sports 
may provide additional motivation to attend and perform well in school for students 
who may not be as motivated by academics alone.69  Some students may also feel 
pressure to receive a scholarship in order to attend a college or university.  
Positioning themselves at a school with a stronger athletic program will allow them 
to shine and increase their chances of receiving a scholarship.  And although it is 
rare that even a superstar high school athlete will go on to play professionally, 
many students yearn to achieve that goal, and some have the ability to at least go to 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. at 536. 
 65. See id. at 535. 
 66. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF INNOVATION AND IMPROVEMENT, CHOOSING A 
SCHOOL FOR YOUR CHILD (2007), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/parents/schools/find/choose/choosing.pdf (U.S. Department of Education’s 
recommendations to parents who are choosing a school for their child). 
 67. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 532–33. 
 68. See Beckett A. Broh, Linking Extracurricular Programming to Academic Achievement:  Who 
Benefits and Why?, 75 SOC. EDUC. 69, 78 (2002) (suggesting that interscholastic sports improves self-
esteem, locus of control, time on homework and social ties between students and parents). 
 69. See, e.g., CAL. INTERSCHOLASTIC FED’N, 2010-2011 CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS § 205 
(2010), available at http://www.cifstate.org/governance/constitution_bylaws/pdf/ 
CIF%20CONST%20BYLAW%20BOOK%201011.pdf; ILL. HIGH SCH. ASS’N, BY-LAWS & 
ILLUSTRATIONS § 3.020 (2010), available at http://www.ihsa.org/org/policy/2009-10/Handbook-
Casebook.pdf ; MO. STATE HIGH SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, supra note 2, § 213.0. 
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play at the collegiate level.70  Prohibiting student athletes from transferring to 
schools for athletic reasons hinders their ability to improve their skills, to better 
position themselves for purposes of scouting and, consequently, diminishes their 
abilities to receive athletic scholarships and their hopes of playing at the 
professional or collegiate level, however slim those chances might be. 
Although it could be argued that allowing students to shop around for schools 
devalues the importance of academics, the opposite may actually be true.  At the 
grade school level, academics and athletics are intertwined.  Athletic associations 
have academic eligibility requirements, which serve as a check on students’ 
participation in interscholastic sports, ensuring that transferring students will 
continue to receive a proper academic education and will be penalized if they fail to 
meet the academic requirements.71  Because students must achieve a certain level 
of academic achievement in order to remain eligible for sports, participation in 
sports may actually have a motivating effect on students.72  In addition, the 
National College Athletic Association has certain academic eligibility conditions 
for incoming freshmen who wish to compete in intercollegiate athletics in Division 
I or II of the NCAA, including minimum entrance exam scores and minimum 
grades in core classes in high school.73  These requirements ensure that academics 
remain a focus for student athletes, in addition to athletics. 
Participation in extracurricular activities also provides a mechanism for students 
to learn important social values such as teamwork, hard work and self-discipline, 
values that may not necessarily be taught or learned in the classroom.74  Students 
whose transfers were not athletically motivated are unnecessarily deprived of an 
opportunity to engage in situations where these values may be learned.  Students 
who transfer to seek a better athletic program are deprived of the opportunity to 
grow as athletes and improve their skills.  In a separate opinion in Indiana High 
School Athletics Ass’n v. Carlberg, Justice Dickson recognized that students and 
 70. See How Many High School Athletes Get to Play NCAA Sports, C. SPORTS SCHOLARSHIPS, 
http://www.collegesportsscholarships.com/percentage-high-school-athletes-ncaa-college.htm (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
 71. See, e.g., MO. STATE HIGH SCH. ACTIVITIES ASS’N, supra note 2, § 213.0; ILL. HIGH SCH. 
ASS’N, supra note 69, § 3.020; CAL. INTERSCHOLASTIC FED’N, supra note 69, § 205. 
 72. See Danielle Tower, Relationship Between Athletic and Academic Success:  A Pilot Study 7–
9 (May 1, 2008) (unpublished Honors Scholar Thesis), available at 
http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=srhonors_theses. 
 73. Ind. High Sch. Athletics Ass’n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 244 (Ind. 1997) (Dickson, J., 
concurring and dissenting).  See also NAT’L C. ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2010–2011 NCAA DIVISION I 
MANUAL § 14.3 (2010), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D111.pdf 
(providing that “Freshman Academic Requirements” include successful completion of sixteen core 
courses and a sliding-scale combination of grades in high school core courses and standardized test 
scores); NAT’L C. ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2010–2011 NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL § 14.3 (2010), available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D211.pdf (stating that “Freshman Academic 
Requirements” include a minimum GPA of 2.00 based on a 4.00 scale in a core curriculum of at least 
fourteen academic courses, including those listed in the manual, and a minimum combined score on the 
SAT verbal/critical reading sections and math sections of 820 or a minimum ACT of 68; requiring 
student’s completion of at least sixteen academic courses, effective Aug. 1, 2013). 
 74. NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, THE CASE FOR HIGH SCHOOL ACTIVITIES 2 
(2008), available at http://www.nfhs.org/content.aspx?id=3262. 
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parents face a difficult choice in determining what school and type of education is 
best for their children, and that for some, athletics is an aspect of education.75  He 
pointed out that athletic involvement provides physical benefits such as “lower[ing] 
mortality rates, promot[ing] cardiovascular and muscular fitness, generat[ing] a 
general feeling of well-being, and reduc[ing] the symptoms of depression and 
anxiety.”76  He also recognized that participation in athletics promotes certain 
developmental and social skills, such as:  
 
enhanced decision-making skills, self-image, character, morality, independence, 
and opportunities for youth to experience a sense of achievement . . . learning how 
to be part of a team, the process of goal setting and working hard, individually and 
within a team, to achieve goals, and how to deal with successes and overcome the 
failures provided in sports.77 
 
If we believe that one of the purposes of education is to teach students social 
values in order to prepare them for their entrance into society, athletics serves as a 
way to teach students a range of practical skills that are critical in the workforce. 
In light of the many valuable skills gained from participation in athletics, parents 
should be free to consider athletics programs in determining where to send their 
children to school.  However, the exploitative recruitment of student athletes 
remains a problem because it takes the decision to choose the school away from the 
parents.  Accordingly, prevention of recruitment should be the only legitimate 
reason to promulgate transfer rules.  Parents should have the choice to determine 
which schools to send their children to without the undue influence of coaches or 
other school authorities, whether through social pressures or monetary incentives 
such as gifts and payments.  Parents have the right to choose an athletic program 
suitable for their children, but recruiting activities infringe upon that right and 
cause student athletes to become pawns exploited by school authorities who are 
furthering their schools’ own interests at the expense of the students’ interests.  
Allowing parents to consider athletics in their choice of school is consistent with 
this anti-recruitment policy because such a policy protects parental choice.  On the 
other hand, when school officials attempt to recruit students and their parents 
through monetary gifts and other benefits, it can no longer be said that the parents 
exercised their free choice.78 
III.  THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST AS IT CURRENTLY APPLIES TO 
TRANSFER RULES 
Transfer rules have been challenged by students, parents and even schools on 
grounds ranging from procedural and substantive due process violations to freedom 
 75. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 243 (Dickson, J. concurring and dissenting). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See e.g., WASH. INTERSCHOLASTIC ACTIVITIES ASS’N, supra note 40, § 27.3.1(A). 
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of religion violations.79  Courts almost unanimously reject such challenges.80  
However, challenges on the basis of equal protection violations seem to earn more 
consideration by the courts.81  Nonetheless, few courts have been willing to 
overrule athletic associations’ uses of transfer rules on equal protection grounds.82  
The Supreme Court of Texas succinctly summarized the equal protection argument 
in Sullivan v. University Interscholastic League: 
 
The transfer rule creates two classes of students:  those who do not transfer from one 
school to another, as compared to those who transfer.  The rule treats these two 
classes of students differently by permitting members of the first group to compete in 
interscholastic activities without any delay while imposing a one-year period of 
ineligibility on the second group.83 
 
Although state high school athletics associations are not technically state 
organizations, courts have unwaveringly held that decisions made by high school 
athletic associations constitute state action because such associations regulate 
interscholastic activities of the public educational system in every state.84 
In deciding how to evaluate state action, courts use a strict level of scrutiny 
when reviewing state actions that either discriminate against suspect classes or 
implicate a fundamental right.85  However, neither of these categories applies here.  
 79. See, e.g., Barnhorst v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 504 F. Supp. 449, 450 (W.D. 
Mo. 1980); Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 227; Sullivan v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 616 S.W.2d 170, 172 
(Tex. 1981). 
 80. See, e.g., Walsh v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152, 161 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Barnhorst, 504 F. Supp. at 467; Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 242; Bruce v. S.C. High Sch. League, 189 
S.E.2d 817, 819 (S.C. 1972). 
 81. See, e.g., Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 226; Sullivan, 616 S.W.2d at 172. 
 82. See, e.g., Sullivan, 616 S.W.2d at 172. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Although high school athletic associations are voluntary organizations and are not official 
instrumentalities of the states, courts have held that their actions constitute “state action” subject to the 
restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds that nearly every public high school is a 
member of an athletic association, the majority of competitions are held on public property and state 
departments of education along with other public educational associations rely on such athletic 
associations to provide a uniform set of regulations to govern extracurricular activities.  See Walsh, 616 
F.2d at 156; Saenz v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026, 1027–28 (5th Cir. 1975); Mitchell v. 
La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 430 F.2d 1155, 1157 (5th Cir. 1970); La. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. St. 
Augustine High Sch., 396 F.2d 224, 227–28 (5th Cir. 1968); Okla. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Bray, 321 
F.2d 269, 272–73 (10th Cir. 1963); Barnhorst, 504 F. Supp. at 457; Gilpin v. Kan. State High Sch. 
Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233, 1237 (D. Kan. 1973); Bucha v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 
69, 73 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Reed v. Neb. Sch. Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258, 260–61 (D. Neb. 1972). 
 85. Classes requiring a strict level of scrutiny are limited to race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1, 
11 (1967) (striking down a statute prohibiting interracial marriages), national origin, Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute which singled out 
Americans of Japanese origin), and alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372–73 (1971) 
(stating that classifications based on alienage are subject to strict scrutiny).  Classes requiring an 
intermediate level of scrutiny are generally limited to gender, Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982), Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–99 (1976), or illegitimacy, Mathews v. 
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976).  The Supreme Court has declined to extend heightened intermediate 
review to classifications based on age, Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976), and 
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The only classes that have been deemed suspect for purposes of equal protection 
analysis are those based on race, national origin and alienage.86  Courts have also 
declined to find any fundamental right implicated in cases involving transfer 
rules.87  If the legislative action in question does not discriminate against a suspect 
class or impinge on a fundamental right, courts will use a lower level of scrutiny.88 
Courts typically use a rational basis level of scrutiny in cases involving social or 
economic legislation that does not discriminate against a suspect class or infringe 
upon a fundamental right.89  According to the rational basis test, a state action will 
be valid only if it is “rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest.”90  
In other words, state conduct that is not rationally related to the achievement of any 
legitimate goals will not pass muster under the equal protection analysis of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  After determining whether a legitimate purpose exists, 
this test requires courts to “reach and determine the question whether the 
classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose.”91  Since the 
purpose of transfer rules is to prevent the recruitment of student athletes—arguably, 
a legitimate state interest—in order for the associations’ conduct to be in 
accordance with the equal protection clause, the associations’ transfer rules must be 
rationally related to achieving this particular goal. 
Many jurisdictions have reluctantly refused to overturn the associations’ transfer 
rules.92  Barnhorst v. Missouri State High School Activities Ass’n involved the case 
of Julie Ann Barnhorst, a student with an outstanding record of academic 
achievement who transferred from one private high school to another.93  The 
mental retardation, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985).  Participation in 
interscholastic sports is not a substantive right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Davenport v. Randolph Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 730 F.2d 1395, 1397 (11th Cir. 1984); Niles v. 
Univ. Interscholastic League, 715 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir. 1983); Hamilton v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. 
Athletic Ass’n, 552 F.2d. 681, 682 (6th Cir. 1976); Zehner v. Cent. Berkshire Reg’l Sch. Dist., 921 F. 
Supp. 850, 863 (D. Mass. 1995); Haas v. South Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495, 497 (Ind. 
1972); Menke v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 441 N.E.2d 620, 623 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981); Bruce, 189 
S.E.2d at 819. 
 86. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (stating that classifications 
based on alienage are subject to strict scrutiny); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (stating that 
the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications be subjected to strict scrutiny); 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute which singled 
out Americans of Japanese origin). 
 87. See Niles, 715 F.2d at 1031 (holding that the transfer rule’s burden on the right to travel 
passed rational basis review because it was “limited in scope and insignificant in magnitude”); 
Barnhorst, 504 F. Supp. at 459 (applying rational basis review because there is no fundamental right to 
education); Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 242 (stating that there is no fundamental right to participate in 
interscholastic sports). 
 88. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). 
 89. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 n.10 (1980). 
 90. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 462 (1988); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 98 (1979). 
 91. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). 
 92. Niles, 715 F.2d 1027; Walsh v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 616 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Ala. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Scaffidi, 564 So. 2d 910 (Ala. 1990); Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. 
Hopkins Cnty. Bd. of Edu., 552 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). 
 93. Barnhorst v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 504 F. Supp. 449, 451–55 (W.D. Mo. 
1980). 
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family believed that the new school offered a superior academic program and 
would thus enhance Julie Ann’s prospects of attending a top-tier university or 
college.94  She had participated in volleyball, basketball and track at her former 
school and sought to continue her athletic participation at the new school.95  The 
Missouri State High School Activities Association’s transfer rule, however, 
prohibited “any student, who transfers from one member school of MSHSAA to 
another member school, [from] participat[ing] in interscholastic athletic 
competition for a period of 365 days from the date of the transfer,” with a few 
exceptions not applicable here.96  Even after learning that she would be denied 
eligibility prior to being admitted to the new private school, Barnhorst enrolled in 
the new school.97  Barnhorst sought a determination of eligibility from the 
executive secretary of Missouri State High School Activities Association.98  After 
Barnhorst was denied eligibility, she appealed to the Board of Control of the 
MSHSAA, invoking the “hardship” exception.99  Although the parties agreed that 
Barnhorst was not recruited to transfer, her appea 100
The district court in Barnhorst held that the transfer rule did not violate the 
equal protection clause.101  Rather than distinguishing between those who transfer 
and those who do not, the court’s classification distinguished between those who 
participate in athletics and those who participate in non-athletic activities—such as 
speech and debate, music and cheerleading—because the MSHSAA’s transfer rule 
only applied to athletic activities.102  Barnhorst had argued that the regulation was 
underinclusive because it failed to include students who had participated in 
recruiting abuses in areas of nonathletic activities.103  However, the district court 
found that because there had never been any noticeable recruiting abuses or 
incidents of school-jumping in areas other than athletics, there was no reason to 
include them in the regulation.104  Barnhorst also argued that the transfer rule was 
overinclusive because it included students, such as herself, who had not been 
solicited or recruited to transfer schools.105  Relying on Supreme Court precedent 
that classifications need not be made free of any mathematical imperfections and 
 94. Id. at 451. 
 95. Id. at 451–52. 
 96. Id. at 450. 
 97. Id. at 452. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 452–54. 
 100. Id. at 452.  The transfer rule did not apply to those who had transferred from one member 
school to another member school upon completion of the highest grade of a school unit to the lowest 
grade of the next recognized unit. Id. at 453.  The transfer rule also exempted students in situations 
where the student did not exercise a choice to transfer, such as in the case of a change in residence of the 
student’s parents or guardian for reasons other than athletics or the closing of a school to a particular 
group of students.  Id. at 453.  Since Barnhorst’s decision to transfer was a voluntary decision, she could 
not avail herself of any of these exceptions.  Id. at 452–53. 
 101. Id. at 458–63. 
 102. Id. at 455. The court stated that the transfer rule had never been applied in these areas, 
because there had never been a perceived need for such a rule in those areas. Id. 
 103. Id. at 459. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 462. 
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that administrative difficulties provide a legitimate basis for enacting rules that 
sweep broadly, the district court also rejected this argument.106 
Although the court in Barnhorst held that the transfer rule was not 
underinclusive, the court acknowledged that the rule did not apply to those who 
participated in nonathletic activities.107  The court also did not consider situations 
in which students may have been recruited prior to the beginning of their ninth 
grade year, and therefore would not be subject to any transfer rule.  In these 
situations, the transfer rule would fail to capture some instances where recruiting 
abuses may have occurred.  In addition, the court even acknowledged that this 
particular rule was overinclusive, but overlooked that fact, reasoning that it would 
be administratively difficult to make individualized determinations.108  As 
discussed later in this Note, the important rights implicated in these cases justify a 
higher standard for evaluating transfer rules—one that would require a closer fit 
between the rule and the prevention of recruitment so that overinclusiveness would 
be minimized, if not eliminated altogether. 
Chabert v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass’n presents a slightly different 
factual scenario where the court reaches a similar result.109  A provision in the 
LHSAA’s transfer rules denied immediate eligibility for athletic competition to any 
student who, upon the completion of the seventh or eighth grade, transferred to any 
high school outside of his or her home district.110  Terrebonne Parish was divided 
into three high school districts by the Terrebonne Parish School Board.111  Chabert 
had completed the eighth grade at a public middle school in one of the districts and 
then subsequently enrolled in Vandebilt Catholic High School, the only Catholic 
high school in the entire Parish, which was located in a district outside of Chabert’s 
home district.112  Chabert was denied eligibility in Vandebilt’s football program.113 
The transfer rule in Chabert distinguished between students whose parents lived 
in the district in which Vandebilt was located, and thus immediately were eligible 
to participate in the sport of their choice, and those who lived outside the district.114  
In upholding the transfer rule, the Supreme Court of Louisiana purported to apply 
the rational basis test but failed to articulate any explanation of how the particular 
transfer rule in question rationally related to preventing “the evils of recruiting,” 
even after it acknowledged that the rule “must be scrutinized in light of its avowed 
purpose.”115  Since Vandebilt was the only Catholic high school in the entire 
Parish, any student wanting to attend the school for religious or other reasons but 
 106. Id. at 461–62. 
 107. Id. at 455. 
 108. Id. at 461–62. 
 109. Chabert v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 323 So. 2d 774, (La. 1975). 
 110. Id. at 778. 
 111. Id. at 775. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 776.  Vandebilt was the only Catholic high school in Terrebone Parish.  Id. at 775.  Had 
he chosen to attend the public high school in his home district or lived in the same district in which 
Vandebilt was located, he would have been immediately eligible.  Id. at 775–76. 
 114. Id. at 780. 
 115. Id. at 779. 
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living outside of the school district would be forced to forgo an entire year of 
interscholastic sports.116  Automatically penalizing these types of students without 
examining the reasons underlying the transfer is not rationally related to the goal of 
deterring recruiting activities because recruitment is only one of a myriad of other 
reasons that a student might decide to attend a different school. 
In Cooper v. Oregon School Activities Ass’n, the two plaintiffs attended 
parochial schools because of their parents’ desire to continue their religious 
education.117  Following their first years in high school, their parents allowed them 
to enroll in public school.118  Although they both participated in athletic programs 
at their previous schools, the court found that athletic motivations played no part in 
their decisions to transfer and that neither of them had been recruited to transfer.119  
In fact, the public school and the parochial school from which one of the students 
had transferred filed and supported a hardship waiver on behalf of one of the 
students.120  Nonetheless, the Oregon School Activities Association (OSAA) 
denied one student’s waiver request.121  The other student was advised by the 
executive director of the OSAA that a similar waiver request would be futile.122  
The OSAA rule provided, in relevant part, that “[a] student who transfers from any 
high school to any member high school becomes ineligible until one calendar year 
after the student first attends the new school.”123  The Court of Appeals of Oregon 
described the rule’s purpose as preserving “harmony among member schools by 
preventing both actual recruitment of high school athletes and the appearance of 
recruitment.”124 
Although the court in Cooper upheld the transfer rule as constitutional, it 
conceded that the rule swept broadly and that it was possible for the OSAA to 
fashion a rule that would avoid penalizing students who had not engaged in 
recruiting abuses.125  In fact, the court even suggested that the athletic association 
create an exception for cases where a student transfers from a parochial or private 
school to a public school.126  The court recognized that in those circumstances, 
students often attend parochial or private schools because of their parents’ desires 
that their children receive a certain type of education, thus establishing a rebuttable 
presumption that the transfer was for nonathletic reasons.127  Despite the court’s 
distaste for the overinclusiveness of the current rule, the court reluctantly declined 
to declare the rule unconstitutional because Oregon law permitted states to enact 
 116. Id. at 776. 
 117. Cooper v. Or. Sch. Activities Ass’n, 629 P.2d 386, 388 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). 
 118. Id. at 388. 
 119. Id. at 388. 
 120. Id. at 389. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 388.  None of the exceptions apply to the plaintiffs. Id. 
 124. Id. at 388. 
 125. Id. at 394. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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laws evincing such a “lack of precision.”128 
The facts in Bruce v. South Carolina High School League similarly illustrate the 
unjustness of such an overly broad rule.129  The transfer rule in Bruce provided that 
a student who “voluntarily transfer[red] from one school to another without a bona 
fide change of residence will be ineligible to participate in interscholastic athletics 
for one year.”130  The stated purpose of the rule was “to prevent the encouragement 
and enticement of athletes to transfer from one school to another.”131  Because the 
rule provided no exceptions, however, the rule, in effect, automatically denied 
eligibility to any student who transferred to another school absent a bona fide 
change of residence regardless of the motivations underlying the transfer.132 
The plaintiffs in Bruce had voluntarily transferred without a change in residence 
from a private school to the local public school and were denied eligibility to play 
football at the public school because of the South Carolina High School League’s 
(SCHSL) transfer rule.133  The parties agreed that the students had not transferred 
as the result of any recruiting activities.134  Once again, despite the finding that the 
students had not engaged in any recruiting violations, the students’ efforts to gain 
eligibility proved futile.135  The court pointed to the “prohibitive administrative 
difficulties” associated with conducting individual factual inquiries as a reason to 
adopt a blanket rule.136  However, because blanket rules represent the most 
egregious violation of equal protection rights, administrative convenience alone 
should not be a sufficient justification for such rules.  By encompassing all transfer 
students within the rule, such a rule sweeps much more broadly than necessary to 
deter recruitment.  These rules fail to punish students that are recruited prior to the 
beginning of high school and enroll at that time.  But more significantly, blanket 
rules reach innocent students who transfer for any number of legitimate academic, 
religious or financial reasons.  These innocent students are prohibited from 
participating in interscholastic athletics without any consideration of the reasons 
underlying their transfer. 
In Indiana High School Athletics Ass’n v. Carlberg, Jason Carlberg transferred 
from Brebeuf Preparatory School, where he participated on the varsity swim team, 
to Carmel High School, for academic reasons.137  The Indiana High Schol Athletics 
Association (IHSAA) denied him full eligibility pursuant to its transfer rule, which 
stated in relevant part: 
 
a student who changes schools without a corresponding change of residence by the 
student’s parents . . . may not participate in interscholastic athletics as a member of a 
 128. Id. at 395. 
 129. Bruce v. S.C. High Sch. League, 189 S.E.2d 817 (S.C. 1972). 
 130. Id. at 818. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 819. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 226 (Ind. 1997). 
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varsity athletic team during the first 365 days after enrollment unless (i) the student 
meets one of the special criteria set forth in Rule 19-6.1 or (ii) is declared eligible 
under the IHSAA “Hardship Rule.”138 
 
The IHSAA transfer rule was designed “[t]o preserve the integrity of interschool 
athletics and to prevent or minimize recruiting, proselytizing and school ‘jumping’ 
for athletic reasons . . . .”139  Although the IHSAA admitted that Carlberg’s transfer 
was not due to athletic motivations, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the 
transfer rule was rationally related to a legitimate interest.140 
In upholding the transfer rule, the Indiana Supreme Court declined to apply its 
own reasoning in Sturrup v. Mahan, a transfer rule case which measured the goal of 
deterring recruitment against the means used to achieve it.141  In Sturrup, Warren 
Sturrup moved from Florida to Indiana to live with his brother in order to escape 
the “demoralizing and detrimental conditions” of his home and school environment 
in Florida, which included living in a two-bedroom house with twelve other people 
and the widespread use of narcotics at his former high school.142  The IHSAA rule 
in place at the time of Sturrup declared student athletes who transferred to another 
school without a corresponding move in their parents’ addresses ineligible for 
athletic competition, unless it was necessary for the student to change residences 
because of “unavoidable circumstances such as the death of the parents or 
guardian.”143  Despite the finding that the circumstances created by his home and 
school environment were so severe, the IHSAA refused to grant Sturrup eligibility 
under the rule’s “unavoidable circumstances” exception.144 
Recognizing that the IHSAA’s transfer rule “suffer[ed] from a serious 
constitutional infirmity,” the Supreme Court of Indiana in Sturrup found that the 
transfer eligibility bylaws were unreasonable in achieving their stated objectives 
because they swept too broadly.145  The Court of Appeals had held that the transfer 
rule was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.146  The Court of Appeals 
applied strict scrutiny analysis, finding that Sturrup had a fundamental right to 
travel.147  Accordingly, it concluded that the state had failed to articulate a 
compelling state interest for the rule and that the rule was necessary to further that 
interest.148  The Supreme Court of Indiana disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ 
equal protection analysis, finding that all transfer students were treated the same 
regardless of whether the student transferred from a school outside the state or from 
 138. Id. at 232.  None of the rule’s exceptions apply in this case.  Id. 
 139. Id. at 236. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Sturrup v. Mahan, 305 N.E.2d 877 (Ind. 1974). 
 142. Id. at 881. 
 143. Id. at 879. 
 144. Id. at 881. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 879. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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a school within the state.149 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Indiana found that the decision to deny 
Sturrup eligibility suffered from another equal protection infirmity.150  The bylaws 
had limited eligibility only to students who changed residences with their parents or 
who, according to the association, fell under the exception of “unavoidable 
circumstances.”151  Accordingly, the court found that the transfer rule was 
unreasonable in that it swept too broadly by creating an irrebuttable presumption 
that all other student athletes had transferred for reasons motivated by athletics and 
automatically denied eligibility to such students.152  The court reasoned: 
 
In short, the purported objective of the transferee eligibility rules is to prevent the use 
of undue influence and school “jumping,” but their practical effect is to severely limit 
the transferee eligibility in general.  The rules as presently constituted penalize a 
student-athlete who wishes to transfer for academic or religious reasons or for any 
number of other legitimate reasons.  Surely, denying eligibility to such transferees in 
no way furthers IHSAA objectives.153 
 
Accordingly, the Court found that the rule as applied in this case was arbitrary 
and capricious.154  Sturrup demonstrates that merely providing for a few exceptions 
to the transfer rule does not solve the rule’s deficiency of being overinclusive.  
First, as the Court in Sturrup recognized, this type of rule creates an irrebuttable 
presumption of athletically motivated transfer for all other students that do not fall 
within the strict boundaries of the exceptions.155  Second, this case illustrates that 
transfer rules often do not include all of the legitimate reasons a student may 
choose to transfer.  A rule creating a limited number of exceptions is likely to 
exclude students who do not fall under the listed exceptions but who do not deserve 
to be penalized under the transfer rule. 
In Robbins v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass’n, the district court reluctantly 
upheld the athletic association’s decision to prevent a transfer student from 
participating in the varsity volleyball team, even though the transfer was not 
athletically motivated.156  The IHSAA’s transfer rule prohibited students who 
transfer without a corresponding change of residence from participating in 
interscholastic sports, unless the student fell within one of thirteen exceptions 
permitting full eligibility.157  The student had transferred from a public school to a 
parochial school, and had established by convincing evidence her recent conversion 
to Catholicism, her desire to seek “new challenges” and her desire to take certain 
 149. Id. at 880. 
 150. Id. at 881. 
 151. Id. at 879. 
 152. Id. at 881. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 882. 
 155. Id. at 881. 
 156. Robbins v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 941 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Ind. 1996). 
 157. Id. at 789. 
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course offerings not available at the public school.158  Despite the finding that the 
transfer was unrelated to athletics, the athletic association had denied her eligibility 
because her circumstances did not fall within any one of the thirteen enumerated 
exceptions.159  The court upheld the decision on due process, religious freedom and 
equal protection grounds, but noted that the plaintiff’s transfer did not violate the 
spirit of the rule.160  The court acknowledged that the rule in question was 
imperfect but noted that the rule should be changed through the athletic association 
rule promulgation procedure and not through the courts.161 
Unlike the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, but like the Sturrup court, 
the Supreme Court of Texas, struck down Texas’ transfer rule on equal protection 
grounds in Sullivan v. University Interscholastic League (UIL).162  The UIL had 
instituted Section 14, which stated, in pertinent part: “A pupil who has represented 
a high school (other than his present school) or academy in either football or 
basketball is ineligible, only in the sport or sports (football or basketball) in which 
he participated, for one calendar year in a school to which he changes.”163  John 
Sullivan moved to Texas from Vermont with his family because his father’s 
employment had been transferred.164  Because John had played basketball in 
Vermont, he was ineligible to play basketball at his new school, even though he 
had not been recruited.165  Here, the transfer rule essentially created two classes of 
students—those who transferred from one school to another and those who did 
not—and treated them differently by allowing those who had not transferred to 
participate in athletics without being subject to a period of ineligibility while 
imposing the penalty on those students who had transferred.166  Although the court 
found that the transfer rule’s intention of discouraging the recruitment of high 
school athletes was a legitimate state purpose, the court held that the rule was not 
rationally related to the deterrence of recruitment because it was overbroad and 
overinclusive.167  The Court reasoned that because the rule broadly affected student 
athletes who were forced to transfer for reasons unrelated to recruitment, the UIL’s 
rule was not rationally related to the purpose of discouraging recruitment.168 
IV.  A PROPOSAL TO MODIFY THE WAY TRANSFER RULES ARE 
 158. Id. at 790. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 793. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Sullivan v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 616 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. 1981). 
 163. Id. at 171 n.2.  The rule also provides two narrow exceptions to Section 14.  Id.  The first 
exception permits students to transfer from their current school to the higher class school nearest to their 
home or the nearest school in their county, provided that they attended their current school for at least 
one year and had accumulated less than fifteen accredited units.  Id.  The second exception permitted the 
transfer of students with one year of eligibility remaining who had a release from their current school 
stating that the student had not been recruited to participate in interscholastic sports.  Id. 
 164. Id. at 172. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 172–73. 
 168. Id. at 173. 
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CURRENTLY EVALUATED 
A.  RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION AND PARENTAL RIGHTS 
JUSTIFIES THE USE OF A HEIGHTENED RATIONAL BASIS TEST 
The current case law regarding parents’ rights to control the education of their 
children warrants reconsidering the manner in which courts have scrutinized (or, 
more accurately, failed to scrutinize) transfer rules.  Rather than simply deferring to 
athletics associations, courts ought to employ a heightened form of the rational 
basis test similar to the level of scrutiny that courts use in situations involving a 
stronger, but nonfundamental, interest.  Although the Supreme Court has refused to 
recognize the right to education as fundamental, education plays a tremendous role 
in teaching students the skills and knowledge necessary to provide a foundation 
upon which they may become productive members of society.169  In Brown v. 
Board of Education, the Supreme Court recognized the extreme importance of 
education in the socialization of children: 
 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments.  Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for 
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society.  It is required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces.  It is the very foundation of good 
citizenship.  Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural 
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust 
normally to his environment.  In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education.  Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.170 
 
Interscholastic athletics may be just as important, if not more so, as a basic 
education to a child’s personal growth and development.  In fact, many 
jurisdictions have found that interscholastic athletics are an integral aspect of a 
secondary education.171 
 169. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).  See also HENRY 
LEVIN ET AL., THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN EXCELLENT EDUCATION FOR ALL OF AMERICA’S 
CHILDREN (2007), available at http://www.cbcse.org/media/download_gallery/Leeds_Report_ 
Final_Jan2007.pdf. 
 170. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 171. See Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Ind. 1997) (“[A]thletics 
are an integral part of this constitutionally-mandated process of education.”); Yanero v. Davis, 65 
S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001) (finding that interscholastic athletics are a governmental function because they 
are an integral part of a secondary education); Thompson v. Bd. of Educ., 79 A.2d 100, 103 (N.J. 
Cumberland Cnty. Ct. 1951) (“The organization of school athletic teams at public schools generally has 
been considered to be an integral part of physical education.”); Martini v. Olyphant Borough Sch. Dist., 
83 Pa. D. & C. 206 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1952)  (holding interscholastic contests are within the field of 
legitimate educational activities); Garza v. Edinburg Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 576 S.W.2d 916, 918 
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Studies have linked participation in interscholastic sports with the development 
of certain desirable qualities of a productive member of society.172  One such 
study, the National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988, found that 
interscholastic sports provide greater academic, social and developmental benefits 
than many other extracurricular activities and sought to explain the reasons 
underlying the benefits.173  The study found a positive correlation between 
participation in interscholastic sports and academic performance, showing a 
relationship between students who participated in interscholastic sports and 
improved math and English grades.174  The study also found that participation in 
interscholastic sports significantly improves self-esteem, “locus of control” (a term 
referring to the extent to which a person believes he can control his own behavior) 
and time spent on homework.175  In addition, the study found that students who 
participate in interscholastic sports exhibit stronger ties with other members of the 
community, including the parents, teachers and school 176
Compared with other extracurricular activities, such as intramural sports and 
vocational clubs, and other athletic activities, such as cheerleading, the study found 
that students who participated in interscholastic sports reaped greater academic, 
social and developmental benefits.177  The author of the study suggests that the 
disparity in benefits is due to the structure of interscholastic sports.178  The author 
notes that interscholastic sports are generally more selective, require greater 
commitment, have more formalized rules and offer competition between 
schools.179  The author believes that as a result of this unique system, those who 
participate in interscholastic sports, as compared to other activities, are exposed to 
“greater structure and routinization, much larger and more intense social networks, 
higher social status for student athletes, and a stronger identity with o
ool.”180 
When deciding the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply, courts must first 
determine whether a suspect class is involved or whether a fundamental right is 
being infringed.181  If either a suspect class or a fundamental right is implicated, 
then the court will apply strict scrutiny, the highest level of scrutiny, examining 
whether there is a compelling state interest for the classification and whether the 
 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (“The primary purpose of the football program is the educational benefit accruing 
 
tsParticipation.pdf; NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH 
 note 72. 




to the students involved in the program.”). 
 172. See DR. DOUGLAS HARTMANN, HIGH SCHOOL SPORTS PARTICIPATION AND EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT:  RECOGNIZING, ASSESSING, AND UTILIZING THE RELATIONSHIP (2008), available at 
http://www.la84foundation.org/3ce/HighSchoolSpor
SCH. ASS’NS, supra note 74; Tower, supra
 173. Broh, supr
 174. Id. at 76. 
 175. Id. at 78.
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 83–84. 
 178. Id. at 81–82. 
 179. Id. at 81–8
 180. Id. at 82. 
 181. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 17 (1
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 legislation that is not rationally related 
wh
 
legislative action is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.182  In determining 
whether a class is “suspect,” the Supreme Court has looked to whether the class 
possesses the “traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is saddled with 
disabilities, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment or relegated to 
such a position of political powerlessness to such an extent as to command 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”183  Thus far, the 
Court has only applied strict scrutiny to race, national origin and alienage.184  In 
cases where the Court finds a “quasi-suspect” classification, the Court will apply 
intermediate scrutiny, which requires the legislative action to serve an important 
governmental objective and to be substantially related to the achievement of that 
objective.185  The Supreme Court has labeled gender and illegitimacy “quasi-
suspect” classes, justifying the use of intermediate scrutiny.186  In all other cases, 
courts apply the rational basis test, upholding governmental actions so long as there 
is a legitimate state interest involved and the action is rationally related to the 
achievement of that interest.187  In such cases, the court is most likely to uphold the 
legislature’s actions.188  However, in some of those cases, the court has applied a 
heightened rational basis test, striking down
en an important interest is at stake.189 
The strong value that courts have placed on a parent’s right to direct the 
upbringing of his or her own child, along with the value that interscholastic sports 
provides in integrating youth into society, justify the use of the higher standard of 
rational basis articulated by the Supreme Court in transfer rule cases.  In Plyler v. 
Doe, the Supreme Court confronted a Texas statute that authorized school districts 
to deny enrollment to children who were not legally admitted to the country and to 
withhold state funds from school districts that enrolled such children.190  The 
Supreme Court struck down the statute on the grounds that it violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.191  In applying equal protection 
analysis, the Court recognized that education allows children to become self-
 182. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). 
 183. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
 184. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause 
demands that racial classifications be subjected to strict scrutiny); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214, 216 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute which singled out Americans of Japanese origin); 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (stating that classifications based on alienage are 
subject to strict scrutiny). 
 185. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender 
biting an illegitimate child from inheriting from his father unless his parents had subsequently 
 
 Thing:  Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
I
ne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 
 ( . 
57 U.S. 202, 205 (1982). 
2. 
classification). 
 186. See id.; Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 855 (1986) (applying intermediate scrutiny to state 
code prohi
married).
 187. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
 188. Clark Neily, No Such
L BERTY 898, 905 n.37 (2005). 
 189. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Clebur
432, 450 1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982)
 190. Plyler v. Doe, 4
 191. Id. at 221–2
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nalysis, the Supreme Court held that Texas had failed 
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 special use permit rested on irrational 
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sufficient members of society.192  The Supreme Court recognized that 
undocumented aliens were not a suspect class and that the right to an education was 
not a fundamental right; however, it also acknowledged that denying an education 
to undocumented children—who have no control over their status—would impose 
a hardship on these children and impair their ability to function in society.193  
Accordingly, rather than simply rubber-stamping the statute, the Supreme Court 
used a slightly more stringent test, which required the court to weigh the 
countervailing costs to the government and the injured class to ensure that the 
classification was reasonably adapted to “the purposes for which the state desire[d] 
to use it.”194  Applying this a
show that denying education to undocumented children furthered some 
substantial state interest.195 
In other cases, the Supreme Court has opted to employ a heightened standard 
even though it has refused to recognize a quasi-suspect class when an important 
interest was involved. In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., the Supreme 
Court struck down a zoning ordinance that required hospitals for the mentally 
retarded to obtain a special use permit in order to operate.196 Although the Supreme 
Court declined to characterize the mentally retarded as a quasi-suspect class, it 
noted that the “mentally retarded, like others, have and retain their substantive 
constitutional rights in addition to the right to be treated equally by the law.”197  
Since it appeared that the rationales for the
judices against the mentally retarded, the Supreme Court held that the ordinance 
was invalid under the rational basis test.198 
Reviewing decisions from other courts also provides insight on how a 
heightened form of the rational basis test should be used.  In the seminal case of 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the highest court of Massachusetts used 
the heightened rational basis standard to hold that Massachusetts may not bar same-
sex couples from getting married.199  In Goodridge, several same-sex couples were 
denied marriage licenses by the Department of Public Health on the ground that 
Massachusetts did not recognize same-sex marriages.200  Because this case did not 
involve a suspect class, the court purported to apply the rational basis test.201  
However, rather than simply deferring to the legislature as it would in cases 
involving the normal rational basis test, the court performed a more searching 
review of the marriage statute.202  This type of examination essentially amounts to 
a heightened form of the rational basis test.  The Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
 192. Id. at 222. 
 193. Id. at 223. 
 194. Id. at 226 (emphasis in original). 
 195. Id. at 230. 
 196. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985). 
 197. Id. at 447. 
 198. Id. at 450. 
 199. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
 200. Id. at 949. 
 201. Id. at 960. 
 202. Id. at 953–69. 
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focused on the importance of civil marriage to individuals and to a well-ordered 
society and discussed the special benefits conferred upon married persons that are 
denied to those who are unmarried.203  In light of the court’s discussions that 
marriage plays an inte
d failed to articulate any rational basis for denying the institution of marriage to 
same-sex couples.204 
Similarly, transfer rules impose a significant burden on the rights of private 
individuals to live their lives without the interference of government.  The Supreme 
Court has held that the government may not interfere with an individual’s right to 
privacy in various aspects of the individual’s life, including the right to obtain 
contraception, the right to marry, the right to procreation, the right to obtain an 
abortion and, of importance here, the right of parents to determine the upbringing 
of their children.205  Just as the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Goodridge, 
placed a high value on marriage in determining the relevant standard of scrutiny, 
the freedom to raise one’s children 
erest that weighs in favor of applying a heightened rational basis standard of 
review in the case of transfer rules. 
In addition, courts have recognized the important value of education and the 
benefits of interscholastic athletics for students.206  The positive effects that 
education and interscholastic sports have on students also justify the use of a 
heightened rational basis standard to evaluate transfer rules.  Although participation 
in interscholastic athletics has not been declared a fundamental right for purposes 
of the due process clause, in certain instances r
urts have recognized that participation in interscholastic sports is still a 
substantial and cognizable individual interest.207 
Interscholastic athletics also play a pivotal role in the area of education.  They 
help build self-confidence, encourage teamwork and healthy competition and help 
develop a myriad of other leadership skills.208  For students who are not 
academically inclined, interscholastic sports may provide a much needed boost of 
 203. Id. at 954–57. 
 204. Id. at 968. 
 205. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding statute allowing married persons, but 
not single persons, to obtain contraception violates equal protection clause); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (concerning right to obtain contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
(recognizing right to marry); Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (affirming right 
to procreation); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (protecting right to obtain abortion); Pierce v. Soc’y 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (supporting right of parents to determine the upbringing of their 
children). 
 206. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Ind. 
High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 236 (Ind. 1997); Haas v. South Bend Cmty. 
Sch. Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972) (DeBruler, J., concurring). 
 207. Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1299 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that females 
have a substantial and cognizable interest in participating in interscholastic sports). 
 208. Benefits of High School Activities, IOWA HIGH SCH. ATHLETIC ASS’N, 
http://www.iahsaa.org/resource_center/Character_Sportsmanship_Safety/Benefit_of_Activities_Handou
t.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2010). 
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motivation to excel in academics—due to academic eligibility requirements—and 
they may help establish a social network for students who are academically-
oriented.209  Participation in interscholastic athletics also offers opportunities for 
students to receive athletic scholarships or, at the very least, to include the activities 
in their applications.  Denying transfer students the ability to compete in 
interscholastic sports, even for one year, could jeopardize their chances of receiving 
either reward.210  Because of the great benefits of allowing students to compete in 
interscholastic sports and the potential ramifications of denying the opportunity to 
innocent students who have not engaged in recruiting activities (
o had no control over their transfers), actions by athletic associations should be 
held to the same standard as that articulated in Plyler v. Doe.211 
When the Plyler standard is applied, it is clear that transfer rules violate the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Plyler requires the court to 
perform an inquiry into whether the classification was reasonably adapted to the 
purposes for which the state intended to use it, by weighing the costs to the state 
and to the injured parties.212  Transfer rules, as applied in these cases, are not 
reasonably adapted to address the issue of recruitment because they oftentimes 
include within their realms students that the rules did not intend to affect.213  
Moreover, the interests of the students and parents involved in these situations do 
not justify the use of such rules.  Students benefit from having a well rounded 
education, which may often include participation in interscholastic sports.214
veloping values such as teamwork, healthy competition and discipline, students 
will be better prepared to live and function as productive citizens in society. 
Two aspects of the transfer rule that would not pass muster under the higher 
Plyler standard are the breadth of the transfer rule and the broad administrative 
discretion of the rule. When measuring whether the rule is reasonably adapted to 
deterring recruitment, any rule that either includes significantly more students than 
the rule intended to affect or fails to include students that the rule intended to 
encompass is not reasonable in application.  In addition, under the higher standard, 
administrative convenience alone probably would not be suffici
letics boards to have nearly unfettered discretion in determining eligibility, 
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t rather than students who had actually been 
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ortunity to participate meaningfully in interscholastic 
athletics at their new school. 
B.  AN ALTERNATIVE HAT SATISFIES THE 
HEIGHTENED STANDARD 
The problem of the transfer rule’s breadth is best demonstrated in Barnhorst v. 
Missouri State High School Ass’n and in Indiana High School Athletics Ass’n v. 
Carlberg, two cases discussed above where the court refused to overturn the 
associations’ decisions to deny eligibility to innocent transfer students.216  In 
Barnhorst, the only exceptions were for students who had been promoted to high 
school or whose parents did not exercise a choice in the decision to transfer.217  
Because the receiving school in Barnhorst, Sunset Hill School, was recognized as 
an exemplary school with a superior academic program, it is conceivable that many 
students, like Barnhorst, might have chosen to attend Sunset for academic 
reasons.218  In fact, the court even acknowledged that there was “no reason to 
suspect that Sunset ever ha[d] or ever would engage in ‘recruiting’ actions, since its 
athletic program [was] distinctly subordinate, in priority, to its academic 
program.”219  Under such circumstances, the transfer rule is more likely to penalize 
innocent students like Barnhors
ruited or solicited to transfer. 
In Carlberg, the court reasoned that the rule acts as a deterrent to athletically 
motivated transfers.220  However, the rule does so at the expense of innocent 
transfer students.  The means chosen to achieve the goal of deterring recruitment 
are hardly rationally related to the purported ends.  Although the rule may deter 
some students from transferring for athletic reasons, in so doing the rule also 
penalizes other students, such as Carlberg, who transfer without a corresponding 
change in residence and who do not fall under one of the exceptions that the 
association deems legitimate.221  A harsh rule that fails to consider the underlying 
reasons for the transfer penalizes students who did not have the foresight to enroll 
in a particular school from the outset.  Consequently, those students who—for any 
legitimate reason—decide that their original school was not a good fit for them are 
deprived of the valuable opp
 TO THE TRANSFER RULE T
Thus far, the transfer rule “solutions” that high school athletics associations have 
created with regards to recruitment have failed to specifically address the problem.  
Transfer rules are beginning to be scrutinized and challenged not only in the 
judiciary but also in the legislature, in the executive branch and in the public forum.  
The Minnesota legislature has recognized that the Minnesota High School League’s 
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transfer rule infringes on the right of school choice.222  Consequently, the 
Minnesota legislature, with the support of Minnesota governor Tim Pawlenty, has 
made several efforts to overrule the league’s transfer rule.223  New Jersey 
Assemblyman Reed Gusciora has urged the New Jersey Interscholastic Athletic 
Association to modify its transfer rule, citing the fact that the rule is unfairly broad 
and consequently affects numerous students who transfer for financial, academic or 
social reasons.224  Gusciora is considering the possibility of legislation to tackle the 
issue.225  Howard Stephenson, a senator in the Utah Legislature, recently proposed
ill that would allow students to transfer between schools for athletic reasons.226 
Along with the transfer rule, many athletics associations also have rules against 
recruitment and respective punishments for those that are found in violation of 
those rules.227  If the transfer rule is simply another mechanism to prevent 
recruitment, then it should be applied to do just that.  Currently, the rule is simply 
too broad to achieve that goal, bringing into its scope students that have transferred 
for reasons wholly or partially unrelated to athletics.  Students who have not been 
subject to any sort of recruitment activities should not be prohibited from 
participating in interscholastic sports simply because the sch
vide an explicit exception for their specific circumstances. 
Rather than burdening students and parents with trying to determine what 
constitutes a “legitimate” transfer—based on vague descriptions of words such as 
“hardship” and “bona fide,” for example—athletics associations should require the 
school board to prove that a student has transferred because he or she has been 
recruited.228  This solution frees the student from the presumption that he or she 
has already been subject to some kind of athletic recrui
le will actually serve the purpose for which it was created. 
Requiring schools to establish that a transfer student has been the target of 
recruiting activities is necessary if the transfer rule is meant to deter the recruiting 
of student athletes without being overinclusive or underinclusive.  By shifting the 
burden to schools to establish recruitment, such a rule would eradicate the 
overbearing presumption that all transfer students have already engaged in 
prohibited activities.  A rule without this presumption is more closely tailored to 
the stated purpose of the transfer rules, a purpose commonly cited by high school 
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school choice are sufficiently important that administrative convenience should not 
be sufficient for high school ath scape a heightened standard. 
ard 
penalize a student accordingly.  Such a rule will ensure that other students do not 
have to suffer the harsh consequences intended for a small number of students. 
 
athletics associations as a justification for their overly broad rules—to protect 
students from exploitation by school authorities.229  More importantly, this type of 
rule allows legitimate transfer students who want to participate in interscholastic 
sports to do so without being deemed ineligible for a period of time for offens
y did not commit.  Such a rule also gives these students the opportunity to reap 
the many benefits of participating and competing in organized athletic activities. 
Proponents of the current rules suggest that performing intensive factual 
inquiries into each case is infeasible because such inquiries are prohibitively 
expensive, could not be staffed by current personnel and would have limited 
success in identifying athletic transfers.230  However, these administrative 
difficulties are justified by students’ rights to be treated equally, the impor
tilling the critical skills that students learn by participating in interscholastic 
sports and the rights of parents to determine how to educate their children. 
The Supreme Court recognizes that students do not discard their rights when 
they enter the schoolhouse building.231  Administrative convenience should not be 
a sufficient justification for these rules when a higher standard of scrutiny is 
applied.232  Although the right to participate in interscholastic athletics is not 
recognized as a fundamental right warranting strict scrutiny, the benefits gained 
from participating in interscholastic sports and the right of students and parents to
letics associations to e
V.  CONCLUSION 
High school athletics associations should strive to better protect the rights of 
student athletes by ensuring that transfer rules are applied only to prevent the 
recruitment of high school athletes.  Protecting these rights is in fact consistent with 
an antirecruiting agenda:  recruiting practices cloud students’ and parents’ transfer 
decisions, exerting undue influence and depriving families of the right to make 
meaningful and voluntary decisions.  Meanwhile, current transfer rules are 
overinclusive, sweeping within their reach many students who transfer for 
legitimate reasons.  Preventing legitimate transfer students from participating in 
interscholastic sports does nothing to discourage the practice of recruitment, but 
rather deprives students who have done no wrong of the opportunity to participate.  
Consequently, the rule should be altered so that a school board must prove a given 
transfer was motivated due to recruitment practices; only then may the bo
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